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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Attorney may take a direct appeal from a supreme court disquali-
fication order since a disqualification proceeding is civil in nature
In New York, appellate review of criminal proceedings is un-
available absent express statutory authority.' CPL section 450.10
grants all defendants in criminal actions the right to appeal from a
judgment of conviction, at which time all intermediate orders and
rulings of the trial court may be challenged for error.2 Since no
I See, e.g., State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 63, 324 N.E.2d 351, 354, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 882
(1975); People v. Zerillo, 200 N.Y. 443, 446-47, 93 N.E. 1108, 1109 (1911); People v. Rediker,
97 App. Div. 2d 928, 929, 470 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (3d Dep't 1983); see also A. WEBER, HAND-
BOOK ON NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 147 (1947) (appeal is statutory resort). Appeals
were unknown at common law. G. CROSS & G. HALL, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 215-16
(1964); E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 54-55 (6th rev. ed. 1967); People v. Kearse, 58
Misc. 2d 277, 283-84, 295 N.Y.S.2d 192, 199 (Onondaga County Ct. 1968). In New York,
both the defendant and the prosecutor are authorized to take criminal appeals in certain
circumstances. See CPL §§ 450.10-.20 (1983); see also N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 4(k) (legislature
may limit right of appeal from nondispositive judgments and orders to appellate divisions).
It is well established that appellate review in criminal cases is neither an inherent right nor
a part of constitutionally required due process of law. See, e.g., People v. Reed, 276 N.Y. 5,
10-11, 11 N.E.2d 330, 333 (1937); People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 539, 52 N.E. 572, 575
(1899); 2 C. BROWNELL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK § 54:01 (rev. ed. 1982). Neverthe-
less, because the right to appeal from a conviction has been granted affirmatively by the
state, denial of this right is recognized as violative of, due process. See People v. Rivera, 39
N.Y.2d 519, 522, 349 N.E.2d 825, 827, 384 N.Y.S.2d 726, 728 (1976) (indigent defendant not
advised by counsel or court of right to appeal entitled to new trial); People v. Montgomery,
24 N.Y.2d 130, 132, 247 N.E.2d 130, 132, 299 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (1969) (indigent minor con-
victed 23 years ago without appealing may be entitled to order vacating judgment if he can
prove at hearing that he was not advised of right to appeal).
2 See CPL § 450.10 (1983). Section 450.10 of the CPL provides, in pertinent part:
An appeal to an intermediate appellate court may be taken as of right by the
defendant from . . . [a] judgment other than one including a sentence of death
Id. A defendant may appeal directly to the Court of Appeals as of right from a judgment
including a sentence of death. Id. § 450.70(1). On appeal from a judgment of conviction, a
defendant may raise for review nearly all orders and decisions made in the court below. See,
e.g., People v. Randall, 9 N.Y.2d 413, 424, 174 N.E.2d 507, 514, 214 N.Y.S.2d 417, 426 (1961)
(denial of motion to dismiss indictment, while not directly appealable, is reviewable on ap-
peal from judgment of conviction); People v. Walker, 27 App. Div. 2d 755, 755, 277 N.Y.S.2d
433, 433-34 (2d Dep't 1967) (decision of trial court on Huntley hearing to determine volun-
tariness of defendant's confession not separately appealable, but can be reviewed on appeal
from conviction). "[The] appellate court may consider and determine any question of law or
issue of fact involving error or defect in the criminal court proceedings . . . " CPL §
470.15(1) (1983); cf. R. PITLER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE UNDER THE CPL § 14.38, at
808 (1972) (although CPL § 470.15 is new, it states a self-evident principle). Section 470.05
of the CPL sets some restrictions on the scope of appellate review by requiring the defen-
dant to "protest" an order of the trial court in order to preserve it for review. See CPL §
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statute provides for immediate appellate review of interlocutory
orders issued during the pendency of a criminal action, appeals
from such orders uniformly have been dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.3 It has been unclear, however, whether appel-
late courts may entertain appeals from orders issued prior to the
commencement of a criminal action, but nonetheless pertaining to
an ongoing criminal investigation, since such orders are not classi-
fied as either criminal or civil.' Recently, in Abrams v. Anony-
470.05(2) (1983). Appellate courts are also bound to disregard errors made by the trial court
"which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Id. § 470.05 (1).
' See, e.g., People v. Gauvreau, 35 App. Div. 2d 741, 741, 316 N.Y.S.2d 78, 78 (2d Dep't
1970) (no direct appeal from interlocutory order denying defendant permission to inspect an
exhibit); People v. Brown, 20 App. Div. 2d 756, 756-57, 247 N.Y.S.2d 528, 529 (4th Dep't
1964) (order denying motion for separate trials of co-defendants not directly appealable);
People v. Schectman, 277 App. Div. 783, 783, 97 N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 (2d Dep't 1950) (order
denying motion to order district attorney to preserve grand jury minutes pertaining to de-
fendant's indictment not directly appealable). The inability to appeal directly from interloc-
utory orders issued in criminal proceedings is well illustrated in the case of In re Alpert, 15
N.Y.2d 937, 207 N.E.2d 199, 259 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1965) (mem). In Alpert, a doctor charged
with the crime of abortion made a motion for an order to have two women examined by a
physician of his choice. Id. at 938, 207 N.E.2d at 200, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 155-56. On appeal
from the denial of his motion, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as to one of the
women since she was a subject of the abortion prosecution, and, thus, the appeal was from
an interlocutory order in a criminal proceeding. Id. As to the other woman, however, no
criminal proceeding was pending and, thus, the appeal could be taken under the CPLR. Id.
at 938, 207 N.E.2d at 200, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
' See Kavanagh v. Vogt, 88 App. Div. 2d 1049, 1049, 452 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (3d Dep't),
afl'd mem., 58 N.Y.2d 678, 444 N.E.2d 991, 458 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1982); Blumenfeld v. Dubin,
49 App. Div. 2d 593, 594, 371 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (2d Dep't 1975); Santangello v. People, 49
App. Div. 2d 220, 224, 374 N.Y.S.2d 107, 111 (1st Dep't 1975), rev'd, 38 N.Y.2d 536, 538-39,
344 N.E.2d 404, 405, 381 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (1976). If a proceeding is deemed civil rather
than criminal in nature, the CPLR, which provides for direct appellate review of a wide
variety of interlocutory orders, will apply. See, e.g., CPLR 5701(2)(iv), (v) (1978) (appeal
may be taken as of right to appellate division from order of supreme or county court that
either "involves some part of the merits; or affects a substantial right"); see SIEGEL § 526, at
722 ("precious few" non-final orders cannot be appealed under CPLR).
Kavanagh involved an article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition to prevent a
county judge from disqualifying the district attorney's office from prosecuting several sus-
pects. 88 App. Div. 2d at 1049, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85. The court noted that even though
"there is no right of direct appeal from the order of disqualification . . . relief by way of
article 78 proceeding is, nevertheless, unavailable." Id. at 1049, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 685. In Blu-
menfeld, however, the court held that an article 78 proceeding did not lie to prevent the
enforcement of a court order that directed a suspect in a criminal investigation to shave his
beard and appear in a lineup, since the order was "essentially civil in character," and thus
appealable. Blumenfeld, 49 App. Div. 2d at 594, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 135. But see People v.
Vega, 51 App. Div. 2d 33, 35 n.2, 379 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 n.2 (2d Dep't 1976) (dictum) (differ-
ent panel on same court hearing Blumenfeld suspect's later appeal notes that, if not bound
by earlier panel's decision, it would hold that direct appeal did not lie "since in effect it is
an intermediate appeal by a defendant in a criminal matter").
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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:435
mous,5 the New York Court of Appeals concluded that a proceed-
ing brought by the attorney general to disqualify an attorney from
representing individuals under criminal investigation is civil in na-
ture, and held, therefore, that direct appeal could be taken from
the supreme court's disqualification order.6
In Abrams, the Attorney General of New York had under-
taken an investigation into fraudulent and illegal ticket sales and
distribution by box office personnel of a large sports arena.7 Four-
teen people employed at the box office were subpoenaed to appear
and testify at an inquiry conducted by the attorney general, and all
fourteen retained the same attorney to represent them.8 Seven of
the employees were called as witnesses, but each, upon advice of
the attorney, refused to answer questions on fifth amendment
grounds.9 Believing that the retention of the same attorney by all
In Santangello, the appellate division ruled that an appeal by a grand jury witness from
an order denying his motion to compel the special prosecutor to advise him whether he had
been the subject of illegal wiretaps was civil in nature, and, therefore, was appealable under
the CPLR. See 49 App. Div. 2d at 224, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 111. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the order was not appealable because it was criminal in nature. 38 N.Y.2d at
538-39, 344 N.E.2d at 405, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
5 62 N.Y.2d 183, 465 N.E.2d 1, 476 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1984).
8 Id. at 194, 465 N.E.2d at 6, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
Id. at 188, 465 N.E.2d at 3, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 496. The attorney general's investigation
was commenced under the authority of article 26-A of the General Business Law, which
provides that the attorney general may make a private or public investigation into alleged
violations of law involving theatrical financing. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW art. 26-A (repealed
1983) (current version at N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFFAIRS LAW art. 23 (McKinney 1984)). The
attorney general is empowered to commence an action to enjoin violations of the laws con-
cerning theatrical financing and to seek restitution of any money or property gained by such
violations. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFFAIRS LAW § 23.11(1) (McKinney 1984). In addition, the
attorney general may commence criminal proceedings to enforce the various penal provi-
sions contained in the statute. See id. § 23.17; see also id. § 23.19 (misdemeanor for em-
ployee of theatrical production to retain payments unlawfully); id. § 23.03(5) (misdemeanor
to make fraudulent statements in connection with financing of theatrical production); id. §
23.05(4) (misdemeanor for person subpoenaed by attorney general, under provisions of this
article, to fail to testify).
The investigation in Abrams focused on a scheme whereby tickets would be diverted to
ticket brokers in return for "ice," defined by the Court as money in excess of the face value
of the tickets. See 62 N.Y.2d at 188-89, 465 N.E.2d at 1, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
8 62 N.Y.2d at 189, 465 N.E.2d at 3, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
9 Id. Since the investigation was not being conducted by a grand jury, but, rather,
under the authority vested in the attorney general by article 23 of the Arts & Cultural
Affairs Law, the witnesses who testified did not automatically receive immunity. See N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFFAIRS LAW § 23.15 (McKinney 1984). As authorized by the statute, id.,
however, the attorney general granted transactional immunity to two of the seven box office
employees called as witnesses, 62 N.Y.2d at 189, 465 N.E.2d at 3, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
Nevertheless, their subsequent testimony failed to incriminate any of the others. Id.
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fourteen employees was interfering improperly with his investiga-
tion,10 the attorney general brought an application to disqualify
the attorney in Criminal Term of the Supreme Court, New York
County." Criminal Term granted the disqualification order,12 and
the attorney appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department,
which affirmed without opinion. 3
A divided Court of Appeals held that there was jurisdiction to
hear the appeal because the proceeding was civil, not criminal, in
nature.14 Judge Jasen, writing for the majority, 5 confirmed the
general rule that direct appeals from interlocutory orders in crimi-
nal proceedings are not available. 16 The Court then observed that
although the proceeding appears "at first glance" to fit within the
statutory definition of a "criminal proceeding,"'1- the proper test
for characterizing a proceeding requires examination of "the true
nature of the proceeding" and "the relief sought."'" As to the true
nature of the proceeding, Judge Jasen observed that there had
been no arrests made, no criminal charges filed, no grand jury em-
paneled, and no criminal prosecution even threatened.' 9 According
to the Court, the only aspect of the proceeding that was criminal in
nature was the attorney general's investigation, from which crimi-
nal charges might or might not result.2 0 Judge Jasen then deter-
mined that the relief sought by the application to disqualify the
attorney had "nothing inherently to do with criminal substantive
10 See 62 N.Y.2d at 196-97, 465 N.E.2d at 8, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 501. The attorney general
contended that the attorney had wrongfully impeded the investigation by advising all of his
clients to refuse to testify without a grant of immunity. Id. at 197, 465 N.E.2d at 8, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 501.
Id. at 190, 465 N.E.2d at 3, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
12 Abrams v. Anonymous, 120 Misc. 2d 134, 145, 465 N.Y.S.2d 798, 804 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1982).
13 Abrams v. Anonymous, 92 App. Div. 2d 484, 459 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dep't 1983). The
attorney general argued before the appellate division that the court should dismiss the ap-
peal for lack of jurisdiction, but the appellate division affirmed on the merits without dis-
cussing its authority to hear the case. See id.; 62 N.Y.2d at 190, 465 N.E.2d at 4, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 497.
14 62 N.Y.2d at 194, 465 N.E.2d at 6, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
15 Judge Jasen was joined in his opinion by Judges Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, and Kaye.
Judge Simons authored a dissent in which Chief Judge Cooke joined.
11 62 N.Y.2d at 190, 465 N.E.2d at 4, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 497; see supra note 1 and accom-
panying text.
17 62 N.Y.2d at 190, 465 N.E.2d at 4, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
18 Id. at 191, 465 N.E.2d at 4, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
19 Id. at 193-94, 465 N.E.2d at 6, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
20 Id. at 193, 465 N.E.2d at 6, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
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or procedural law."' 21 Thus, having determined that it had jurisdic-
tion over the appeal, the Court proceeded to the merits and re-
versed the disqualification order.2
Judge Simons dissented from the holding on the jurisdictional
issue, asserting that the Court had created an unwarranted excep-
tion to the rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals in criminal pro-
ceedings.2 The dissent observed that the rule against interlocutory
criminal appeals was designed to eliminate excessive appellate
practice and the accompanying delay in litigation, and warned that
courts should refrain from creating exceptions to it without first
identifying compelling policy reasons for doing SO.
2 4
2. Id. at 194, 465 N.E.2d at 6, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 499. The court further noted that a
motion to disqualify an attorney, similar to a motion to quash a subpoena, "may arise as
easily in the context of a purely civil lawsuit as in a purely criminal case." Id.
22 Id. at 200-01, 465 N.E.2d at 10, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 503. The Court was not persuaded
by the contention that the attorney's advice to his clients to remain silent unless granted
immunity constituted a legal or ethical impropriety. Id. at 198, 465 N.E.2d at 8, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 501. The majority also found unpersuasive the attorney general's claim that his
investigation was impeded by the attorney's tactics, as there were many investigative ave-
nues available. Id.
23 Id. at 201, 465 N.E.2d at 10, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (Simons, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent observed that the proceeding instituted by the attorney general fit squarely within the
definition of a criminal proceeding contained in the CPL. Id. at 202, 465 N.E.2d at 11, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 504 (Simons, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 18. In addition,
Judge Simons strongly rejected the majority's characterization of the proceeding as similar
to a motion to quash a subpoena, which is recognized by caselaw as civil in nature and, thus,
directly appealable. 62 N.Y.2d at 203, 465 N.E.2d at 11-12, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05 (Simons,
J., dissenting). An order denying a motion to quash a subpoena, or one quashing a sub-
poena, is directly appealable provided that the court that entered the order had both civil
and criminal jurisdiction. See Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 317, 347 N.E.2d 915,
916, 383 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (1976) (per curiam). Since the motion to quash a subpoena is
classified as civil in nature, see id., the allowance of a direct appeal is not a true exception to
the rule that interlocutory appeals cannot be taken in criminal proceedings, although it is
sometimes referred to as such, see, e.g., Abrams v. Anonymous, 62 N.Y.2d at 203, 465
N.E.2d at 11, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 504 (Simons, J., dissenting).
24 62 N.Y.2d at 203, 465 N.E.2d at 12, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 505 (Simons, J., dissenting).
Judge Simons stressed that the majority's opinion was inconsistent with the policies under-
lying two of the Court's recent decisions, Kavanagh v. Vogt, 58 N.Y.2d 678, 444 N.E.2d 991,
458 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1982) (mem.), and Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 454 N.E.2d 522,
467 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1983). See 62 N.Y.2d at 203, 465 N.E.2d at 12, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 505
(Simons, J., dissenting). In Kavanagh, the Court held that an article 78 proceeding in the
nature of prohibition does not lie to prevent the implementation of an order disqualifying
the district attorney's office from prosecuting certain cases. 58 N.Y.2d at 679, 444 N.E.2d at
992, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 528. In Schumer, a congressman brought an article 78 proceeding chal-
lenging a purported delegation of prosecutorial authority to Dean Trager of Brooklyn Law
School by the district attorney for Kings County for the purpose of investigating improprie-
ties in the congressman's election campaign. 60 N.Y.2d at 49, 454 N.E.2d at 523, 467
N.Y.S.2d at 183. The congressman also sought to disqualify the district attorney from the
1985] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
It is submitted that the result achieved by the Abrams Court
on the jurisdictional issue is sound, but that the analysis employed
to reach this holding is likely to cause confusion and uncertainty
over whether an appeal can be taken from orders relating to crimi-
nal investigations. The decision provides for direct review of an
important interlocutory order that would otherwise escape mean-
ingful appellate review.2 5 A disqualification order implicates both
an individual's sixth amendment right to counsel and first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of association. 26 Nevertheless, if the at-
torney's clients had to wait until conviction to appeal an order vio-
lating these rights, it is submitted that it is unlikely that an
appellate court would view the error as sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant reversal. Only when a defendant's right to counsel has
been denied completely, or when there has been ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, have courts viewed the error as prejudicially con-
tributing to the conviction.27 Even if the appellate court does re-
case. Id. at 54, 454 N.E.2d at 523, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 186. The Court held that an article 78
proceeding was a proper vehicle by which to challenge an alleged illegal delegation of
prosecutorial authority, but also held that the same proceeding was not available to seek
disqualification of the district attorney. See id. at 49, 454 N.E.2d at 523, 467 N.Y.S.2d at
183. Concerning the application to disqualify, the Court observed that "premature applica-
tions are not to be encouraged because they are wasteful and may be employed as delaying
tactics." Id. at 55, 454 N.E.2d at 526, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
11 See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. The rule against allowing direct ap-
peals from interlocutory orders is not designed to insulate completely determinations made
by the trial court from appellate review, rather, it is intended to prevent fractured, piece-
meal review of decisions. See CPL § 450.10, commentary at 513 (McKinney 1983); see also
People v. Coppa, 45 N.Y.2d 244, 249, 380 N.E.2d 195, 198, 408 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (1978)
(rule prevents discontinuance of ongoing trials).
26 See Abrams, 62 N.Y.2d at 196, 465 N.E.2d at 7, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 500; People v. Doe,
98 Misc. 2d 805, 807, 414 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620-21 (Nassau County Ct. 1979); Gingenti,
Problems of Joint Representation of Defendants in a Criminal Case, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
55, 55-56 & 56 n.3 (1979) (sixth amendment not only guarantees criminal defendant effec-
tive assistance of counsel but also right to attorney of own choosing).
" See Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1056 (1984) (total denial of right to
counsel results in new trial without any need for showing prejudice to the defendant); Peo-
ple v. Bell, 48 N.Y.2d 933, 935, 401 N.E.2d 180, 181-82, 425 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58-59 (1979) (new
trial ordered for defendant who received clearly ineffective assistance of counsel at trial);
People v. Narayan, 76 App. Div. 2d 604, 612, 431 N.Y.S.2d 556, 561 (2d Dep't 1980) (denial
of right to assistance of counsel invalidates trial). If the right to counsel has not been totally
denied, or if there has not been clearly ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice will not be
presumed. See Flanagan, 104 S. Ct. at 1056. It is submitted that the box office employees in
Abrams would not be able to prove the requisite prejudice necessary to win reversal of a
conviction because the need for an attorney prior to the commencement of a criminal action
or arrest is not as crucial as is representation at trial. If forced to raise the disqualification
issue on appeal from a conviction, the parties in Abrams might also run afoul of CPL §
470.05, which provides: "An appellate court must determine an appeal without regard to
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:435
verse, it is suggested that the remedy of reinstatement with a new
trial would not be adequate to compensate the aggrieved clients
who have had to endure a criminal investigation without the ser-
vices of the attorney of their choice.
While the Abrams Court properly recognized the need for im-
mediate appellate review of interlocutory disqualification orders, it
is submitted that an analysis classifying an application to disqual-
ify an attorney as civil in nature is contrary both to the clear lan-
guage of the CPL28 and to recent holdings of the Court of Ap-
peals. 9 It is further suggested that such an analysis is likely to
technical errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." CPL §
470.05(1) (1984); see People v. Gramaglia, 71 App. Div. 2d 441, 445, 423 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (4th
Dep't 1979) ("defendant is entitled to fair trial, not a perfect one"). In the case of an error
not reaching constitutional dimensions, the test for "harmless error" is whether "there is a
significant probability, rather than only a rational possibility, in the particular case that the
jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error or errors which oc-
curred." People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242, 326 N.E.2d 787, 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213,
222 (1975). If the error is of constitutional proportions, however, the test is less stringent:
the error is harmless only if "there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have
contributed to defendant's conviction and that it was thus harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d at 237, 326 N.E.2d at 792, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 218. With respect
to disqualification orders entered prior to the commencement of a criminal action, even
assuming application of the lower barrier of the constitutional harmless error rule, it is sub-
mitted that the error would be deemed harmless because of its remoteness to the conviction.
28 See 62 N.Y.2d at 201-02, 465 N.E.2d at 10-11, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 503-04 (Simons, J.,
dissenting). Under the CPL, a criminal proceeding is defined as:
any proceeding which (a) constitutes a part of a criminal action or (b) occurs in a
criminal court and is related to a prospective, pending or completed criminal ac-
tion, either of this state or of any other jurisdiction, or involves a criminal
investigation.
CPL § 1.20(18) (1981). The Court explicitly acknowledged that the investigation in Abrams
was criminal in nature. 62 N.Y.2d at 195, 465 N.E.2d at 7, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 500. As the
dissent noted, the prospective criminal action arose out of a criminal investigation. Id. at
202, 465 N.E.2d at 10-11, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 503-04 (Simons, J., dissenting). Nor was there any
question that the application was made in a criminal court. Id. at 202, 465 N.E.2d at 11, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 504 (Simons, J., dissenting). The Court never attempted to show that the pro-
ceeding did not fit within the definition of a criminal proceeding contained in the CPL, but
rather insisted that the proper test for determining the nature of a case required a determi-
nation of the true nature of the proceeding and the relief sought. See id. at 191-94, 465
N.E.2d at 4-6, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 497-99; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
2 See Alphonso C. v. Morgenthau, 38 N.Y.2d 923, 924-25, 346 N.E.2d 819, 819, 382
N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (1976) (per curiam). Alphonso C. was a consolidation of two appeals. In
one case, Alphonso C., the supreme court had granted an order on application of the district
attorney that directed the appellant to appear in a lineup. Id. at 924, 346 N.E.2d at 819, 382
N.Y.S.2d at 981. In the other, Angelo G., an order had issued under similar circumstances
directing several suspects to provide a handwriting example to the district attorney. Id. In
both cases, no criminal action had been commenced against the appellants, and no grand
jury was investigating them. Id. The orders were sought merely as an aid in the district
attorney's investigation of certain crimes. Id. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals
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frustrate the policies underlying the rule prohibiting direct appel-
late review of interlocutory criminal orders 0 and lead to increased
attempts to appeal such orders on the theory that the proceeding
is civil rather than criminal in nature. 31 Therefore, the Court
should discontinue use of the legal fiction employed in Abrams and
instead should classify the holding of the case as a legitimate ex-
ception to the rule that interlocutory orders in criminal proceed-
ings may not be directly appealed.
Bernard D'Orazio
taken in both cases on the ground that the orders were granted in criminal proceedings, as
defined in the CPL, and, therefore, were not directly appealable. Id. at 925, 345 N.E.2d at
819, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 981. It is submitted that the decisions of the Court in Alphonso C. and
Abrams v. Anonymous are in direct conflict and cannot be reconciled.
30 See H. UVILLER, THE PROCESSES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INVESTIGATION AND ADJUDICA-
TION 1264 (2d ed. 1979). If interlocutory appeals were permitted in criminal actions, litiga-
tion would be "compounded unduly by protracted and multifarious appeals and collateral
proceedings frustrating the speedy determination of disputes . . . . [rendering a] speedy
trial a legal impossibility." State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 63-64, 324 N.E.2d 351, 354-55, 364
N.Y.S.2d 879, 882-83 (1975); see also Lauter, Justices to Hear Attorney Disqualification
Case, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 29, 1984, at 5, col. 1. New York courts have consistently observed that
the main purpose of the rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals is to prevent delay in bring-
ing offenders to trial and judgment. See, e.g., People v. Coppa, 45 N.Y.2d 244, 249, 380
N.E.2d 195, 198, 408 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (1978).
31 For example, there appears to be no reason why suspects in criminal investigations
who are ordered by a court on application of the district attorney to submit to the taking of
samples of hair or blood, or for photographs of their teeth or jaw, could not use the Abrams
rationale to secure direct appellate review of their claims. It is submitted that cases of this
nature do not merit direct appellate review in that the nature of the rights violated is such
as can effectively be remedied on appeal from conviction through the grant of a new trial
and the suppression of the wrongfully obtained evidence. It is when the nature of the wrong
cannot later be remedied, as, it is submitted, in a case of a disqualification of a suspect's
attorney, that the court should allow a direct appeal as an exception to the general rule.
